Airports, Droneports, and the New Urban Airspace by Ravich, Timothy M.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 44
Number 3 Drone City Article 1
2017
Airports, Droneports, and the New Urban Airspace
Timothy M. Ravich
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Timothy M. Ravich, Airports, Droneports, and the New Urban Airspace, 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 587 (2017).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol44/iss3/1
  
587 
AIRPORTS, DRONEPORTS, AND THE NEW 
URBAN AIRSPACE 
Timothy M. Ravich* 
ABSTRACT 
By simply purchasing a small unmanned aerial vehicle—“UAV” or 
“drone”—online or off the shelf of a hobby store, anybody can fly in 
any airspace, from anywhere, at any time using an ordinary 
smartphone or tablet.  The potential for conflict between these 
unmanned and automated devices and traditional manned aircraft is 
pronounced at low altitudes in flight corridors at, near, over, and 
around airports across the world.  Under statutory and decisional 
precedent dating back at least to the 1940s, federal lawmakers assert 
exclusive jurisdiction over all aviation operations in the national 
airspace system (“NAS”), which is generally recognized as beginning 
approximately five hundred feet above ground level.  With drones, 
however, the Federal Aviation Administration is also increasingly 
asserting its authority in all airspace “above the grass.”   
This Article presents the central property law problems (i.e., air 
and land use) raised by contemporary technological advances in 
unmanned aviation and broadly argues against federal control of the 
airspace beneath the NAS, particularly with respect to uncontrolled 
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areas around airports.  In doing so, this Article offers a specific 
critique of the recently enacted regulatory scheme for small UAVs 
which allow some airport authorities to stop an operator from 
launching a drone, yet not from flying near or around the airport—a 
perplexing set of circumstances from a safety and operational 
perspective.  Accordingly, federal regulators should revise or update 
recently enacted rules governing the operation of small UAVs to 
provide definitive and deferential authority to local airports with 
respect to the operation of drones in uncontrolled airspace. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps more exciting and surprising than the double-digit 
halftime lead that the Atlanta Falcons built over (but ultimately lost 
in overtime to) the defending champion New England Patriots in 
Super Bowl LI at NRG Stadium in Houston, Texas, in February 2017, 
was the halftime show.  The intermission featured a synchronized 
swarm of three hundred illuminated “Shooting Star” drones flying 
over and behind Lady Gaga in the formation of an American flag as 
she recited the Pledge of Allegiance from the roof of the stadium—
only the drones were not really there.1  To comply with a new 
regulation prohibiting the flight of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(“UAVs”) over people,2 Intel Corp. pre-recorded the formation 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Henri Gendreau & Alan Levin, Lady Gaga Halftime Drone Swarm Was 
Pretaped to Shield Crowd, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-02-07/lady-gaga-s-halftime-drone-swarm-was-pretaped-to-shield-
crowd [https://perma.cc/9B28-C2W8]; see also Ted Greenwald, Intel Basks in 
Afterglow of Halftime Show, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 7, 2017, at B6 (“Many TV viewers 
thought they were watching a live light show, a perception Intel didn’t go out of its 
way to dispel.  ‘Our drones have returned to the ground after an amazing 
#PepsiHalftime show,’ the company tweeted shortly afterward.”). 
 2. 14 C.F.R. § 107.39 (2016) (“Operation over human beings.  No person may 
operate a small unmanned aircraft over a human being unless that human being is:  
(a) [d]irectly participating in the operation of the small unmanned aircraft; or (b) 
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flying and then fed the footage into the game day broadcast—fans in 
the stadium watched the video just like home viewers.3  Although the 
drone portion of the show was not live—the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”) designated the Super Bowl as a “no drone 
zone”4—it “illustrated the ways large companies are embracing 
unmanned aircraft in sometimes unexpected ways.”5  Moreover, the 
halftime show spotlighted the tension between law and technology in 
urban settings and the precautionary steps regulators take to limit or 
ban even apparently reliable and safe UAV operations, while 
innovators push the envelope.6  In fact, regulators approach drones as 
lawmakers charged with protecting public health, safety, and welfare 
have historically approached novel technologies—with mistrust and 
restrictive rules, if not a total ban.7 
This skepticism is not entirely unfounded.  While drones that are 
ready to fly out of the box are celebrated for opening the skies to 
numerous aviation enthusiasts and entrepreneurs,8 the opportunity 
                                                                                                                 
[l]ocated under a covered structure or inside a stationary vehicle that can provide 
reasonable protection from a falling small unmanned aircraft.”).  This limitation is 
waivable under 14 C.F.R. § 107.205(g). 
 3. Gendreau & Levin, supra note 1 (“Intel also produced a holiday show with 
Disney in Florida . . . with drones forming a green Christmas tree and a blue dove, 
among other effects.”). 
 4. No Drone Zone for Those Attending the Super Bowl, FED. AVIATION 
ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=87305 [https://perma.cc/6RBM-
2VGT] (last updated Feb. 1, 2017) (“Temporary Flight Restrictions will prohibit 
certain aircraft operations, including unmanned aircraft operations, or drones, within 
a 34.5-mile radius of NRG Stadium in downtown Houston, Texas on game day.”). 
 5. Gendreau & Levin, supra note 1. 
 6. Whether relating to drones, self-driving cars, or other “smart” devices that are 
a part of the Internet of Things, today’s innovators and regulators are sometimes 
finding it difficult to find a middle ground. See generally Greg Bensinger, Uber 
Moves Self-Driving Car Test to Arizona After Regulatory Defeat in California, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-moves-self-driving-
car-test-to-arizona-after-regulatory-defeat-in-california-1482442732 
[https://perma.cc/WK3D-9E9K]; Greg Bensinger & Tim Higgins, Uber’s Clash with 
Regulators Moves to Self-Driving Cars, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-clash-with-regulators-moves-to-self-driving-cars-
1482090589 [https://perma.cc/4U6A-DQNZ]  (“Uber has defiantly offered rides to 
San Francisco customers in a handful of autonomous vehicles despite opposition 
from California regulators who demand the company get a state permit or pull the 
autos off the road . . . . [The company refused to apply for California’s autonomous-
driving permit on the basis that] its robot cars must be manned by humans, rendering 
them less than fully autonomous.”). 
 7. See, e.g., EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK (1996) (discussing how 
unintended effects of technology may warrant the need for increased vigilance). 
 8. Notwithstanding obvious challenges posed by UAV flight over, near, at, and 
around airports, UAV operations offer airport owners, operators, and users many 
potentially beneficial applications:  terminal and perimeter inspection; airfield 
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for novices with no experience or operators with bad intentions to fly 
at any time from any place, or “virtually” from any place, and for any 
purpose in relative anonymity is concerning.  Inexperienced and 
nefarious operation of UAVs raises important questions of safety, 
privacy, and security—issues that are acute for airport owners, 
operators, and users.  The potential for drones to collide or interfere 
with traditional airplanes is perhaps the most obvious concern 
associated with UAVs flying over, near, at, and around airports and 
heliports.  Designing a new set of rules to eliminate or mitigate this 
risk requires regulators to weigh the probability of harm and the 
seriousness of harm that might result from errant or reckless drone 
operation.  Until only recently (with the enactment of 14 C.F.R. Part 
107 in August of 2016), the FAA effectively banned all civil (i.e., non-
governmental) operations of small drones (those weighing less than 
fifty-five pounds), reflecting a policy decision that the gravity of an 
accident or incident involving a drone outweighed any probability of 
such an event occurring.9  This reasoning was undoubtedly informed 
by reports about drones conflicting and nearly colliding with 
passenger jets and other aviation traffic around some airports.10 
                                                                                                                 
condition inspections and foreign object debris detection; traffic management; 
parking surveillance; emergency response and event management; airport 
construction, infrastructure and property surveying, and capital project support; 
wildlife management; aircraft maintenance; passenger services; cargo operations; 
accident response; and safety management and inspections. See, e.g., Alan Levin, 
FAA:  Small Drones Will Provide Significant Benefits, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-14/small-drones-to-provide-
significant-benefits-faa-says [https://perma.cc/9MPY-F9LC]; Proposals for Droneport 
Project Launched to Save Lives and Build Economies, FOSTER + PARTNERS (Sept. 16, 
2015), http://www.fosterandpartners.com/news/archive/2015/09/proposals-for-drone
port-project-launched-to-save-lives-and-build-economies/ [https://perma.cc/7TYG-
AEVC]. 
 9. Manufacturers and safety-conscious drone operators themselves believe that 
just one tragedy involving a reckless or careless drone operator and a commercial jet 
would undo the progress made by responsible drone builders and users and doom the 
development of all civil and commercial drone industries from a regulatory point of 
view. Am. Ass’n of Airport Execs., UAS Issues and Integration Conference (Nov. 9-
11, 2016) [hereinafter UAS Issues and Integration Conference] (comments of various 
panelists and attendees). 
 10. FAA Releases Updated Drone Sighting Reports, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=87565 [https://perma.cc/ZV78-8YSW] 
(last updated Feb. 23, 2017), stating that, as of February 23, 2017, 
[r]eports of possible drone sightings to FAA air traffic facilities continued to 
increase during FY 2016.  There were 1,274 such reports from February 
through September last year, compared with 874 for the same period in 
2015.  Although the data contain several reports of pilots claiming drone 
strikes on their aircraft, to date the FAA has not verified any collision 
between a civil aircraft and a civil drone.  Every investigation has found the 
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In fact, in 2015, the FAA released a report of 650 “possible 
encounters with unmanned aircraft” between November 2014 and 
August 2015—with drone “sightings” estimated as high as one 
hundred per month in 2015—five times as many as one year earlier.11  
Most reported drone encounters occurred above 3000 feet, an 
airspace that is well above the five hundred foot ceiling established 
for commercial UAVs and the four hundred feet recommended for 
model aircraft, a fact that prompted a critical Aviation Week & Space 
Technology editorial: 
The FAA did itself no favors by releasing a list of 650 “possible 
encounters with unmanned aircraft” between November 2014 and 
August 2015.  This mixes pilot sightings close to airports, where the 
threat is highest, with passing encounters and reports from air traffic 
controllers and the public.  It is good for grabbing headlines, but not 
for defining the dangers.12 
Perhaps so, but in 2016 headlines of drone encounters with 
commercial jets persisted as a Porter Airlines Bombardier Q400 twin-
propeller airplane reportedly swerved over Canadian airspace to 
avoid colliding with a drone; two cabin crew were injured, making the 
incident perhaps the first reported example of personal injury caused 
by a near-collision with a drone.13 
Although complete data showing the actual number of potential 
conflicts between manned and unmanned airplanes near airports is 
wanting, anecdotal evidence is not hard to find worldwide.14  In 
March 2015 for example, the United Arab Emirates Department of 
Economic Development banned the use and sale of recreational 
drones after one flew too close to critical flight paths and forced the 
                                                                                                                 
reported collisions were either birds, impact with other items such as wires 
and posts, or structural failure not related to colliding with an unmanned 
aircraft. 
 11. Get Data on Risk UAS Pose to Air Traffic, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., 
Sept. 11, 2015, at 1. 
 12. Id.; see also Craig Whitlock, FAA Records Detail Hundreds of Close Calls 
Between Airplanes and Drones, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/world/national-security/faa-records-detail-hundreds-of-close-calls-
between-airplanes-and-drones/2015/08/20/5ef812ae-4737-11e5-846d-02792f854297_
story.html [https://perma.cc/8X9E-CAMG]. 
 13. Crew Members Injured as Plane Avoids Near Collision with Suspected 
Drone, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
nov/14/toronto-airport-drone-incident-injuries-canada [https://perma.cc/USE6-J3JT]. 
 14. See, e.g., Gareth Corfield, Idiot Flies Drone Alongside Flybe Jet Landing at 
Newquay Airport, REG. (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/08/11/
drone_near_miss_flybe_newquay_airport/ [https://perma.cc/X53E-9D67] (“Although 
the near-miss was reported to police, a search of the area revealed no trace of the 
drone or its operator . . . .”). 
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suspension of all flights at Dubai International Airport.15  In 2016, 
Dubai’s airport—the third busiest in the world—was forced to shut 
down three separate times because of unauthorized drone activity, 
with the most recent shutdown requiring the diversion of flights and 
the closing of the airport for ninety minutes at a cost of one million 
dollars per minute.16  Dubai’s experience is not isolated; Polish 
aviation authorities took steps to revise their drone regulations as a 
reaction to a near-collision between a drone and a commercial jetliner 
at Warsaw Chopin Airport.17  In the United States, meanwhile, 
vendors Brookstone and Hudson News removed UAVs from their 
airport store shelves after New York and New Jersey transportation 
authorities demanded that they stop offering the merchandise for 
sale.18  With the FAA projecting seven million drones in the national 
airspace by 2020,19 whether and how to integrate UAV operations in 
an ecosystem originally designed for manned flights is as unresolved 
as the question of who (local, state, or federal authorities) should 
have authority over operations in that airspace. 
This Article focuses on the operational and regulatory problems 
implicated by drones operated near, over, at, and around the nation’s 
airports.  While a new body of scholarship discussing the 
constitutional and common law issues connected to UAV operations 
is developing,20 no literature dedicated specifically to the unique legal 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Anwar Ahmad, Sale of Recreational Drones Banned in Abu Dhabi, NAT’L 
(Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.thenational.ae/uae/sale-of-recreational-drones-banned-
in-abu-dhabi [https://perma.cc/DK54-KMJN]. 
 16. Zahraa Alkhalisi, Dubai Deploys a ‘Drone Hunter’ to Keep Its Airport Open, 
CNNMONEY (Nov. 4, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/04/technology/dubai-
airport-drone-hunter/ [https://perma.cc/69T5-KN63]. 
 17. Safe Sky–Regulations on Flying Drones in Poland, URZAD LOTNICTWA 
CYWILNEGO (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.ulc.gov.pl/en/270-english/current-information/
3806-safe-sky-regulations-on-flying-drones-in-poland [https://perma.cc/47DC-K4AL]; 
see also Andy Eckardt, Drone Nearly Hits Lufthansa Plane near Warsaw Airport:  
Man Questioned, NBC NEWS (July 22, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/
world/drone-nearly-hits-lufthansa-plane-near-warsaw-airport-man-questioned-
n396481 [https://perma.cc/FPV9-9WQG]. 
 18. Pavithra Mohan, Airport Stores Agree to Stop Selling Drones After Plea 
from Port Authority, FAST CO. (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/
3050155/fast-feed/airport-stores-agree-to-stop-selling-drones-after-plea-from-port-
authority [https://perma.cc/5RA5-G7XZ]. 
 19. FAA Releases 2016 to 2036 Aerospace Forecast, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,  
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=85227 [https://perma.cc/E5V3-P6TS] (last 
updated Mar. 24, 2016). 
 20. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the First and 
Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49 (2015); A. Michael Froomkin & P. 
Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots and Drones, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2015); 
Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism:  Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 
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issues of drones and airports exists.  This Article intends to fill that 
gap, first by offering an overview of lawmaking and airports 
historically, then by evaluating the precedent upon which current 
decisions respecting airspace are based, and finally by drawing from 
scholarship arguing in favor of a state- and local-based approach to 
privacy regulation and private property rights implicated by the drone 
revolution,21 to posit that federal regulators should revamp recently 
enacted laws to give definitive guidance and authority that is 
deferential to local airports with respect to the operation of drones in 
uncontrolled airspace. 
I.  REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES  
TO INNOVATIONS IN AVIATION 
Legal controversies introduced by drone operations are more 
jurisdictional than technological.  And, they are not entirely new.  In 
fact, the operation of drones is reminiscent of the land use and urban 
planning issues associated with airports during the last century.  Both 
involve a contest between private and public land ownership and use, 
on the one hand, and federal versus state and local government, on 
the other hand.  Thus, where drones are permitted to fly is a critical 
issue whose resolution both depends upon and is limited by legal 
precedent established in the middle of the last century with respect to 
manned airplane operations vis-à-vis airports and private property.  
Now, as then, courts are asked to decide controversies pitting new 
technologies against long-standing legal principles from a utilitarian 
point of view. 
In the 1920s case Dysart v. City of St. Louis,22 for example, a 
Missouri taxpayer attempted to enjoin the development of a publicly-
funded airport on the basis that the concept of an airport ran counter 
to the general or public welfare: 
It will afford a starting and landing place for a few wealthy, ultra-
reckless persons, who own planes and who are engaged in private 
pleasure flying.  They may pay somewhat for the privilege.  It will 
                                                                                                                 
4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57 (2013); Kenneth Maher, Flying Under the Radar:  Low-
Altitude Local Drone Use and the Reentry of Property Rights, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 102 (2017); Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, 
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (2016); Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 
B.U. L. REV. 155 (2015); John Villasenor, Observations from Above:  Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L.  PUB. POL’Y 457 (2013). 
 21. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 20, at 59 (arguing that the “complex space of 
privacy regulation is best left to the states”); Troy A. Rule, Drone Zoning, 95 N.C. L. 
REV. 133 (2016). 
 22. 11 S.W.2d 1045 (Mo. 1928). 
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afford a starting and landing place for pleasure tourists from other 
cities, alighting in St. Louis while flitting here and yon.  It will offer a 
passenger station for the very few persons who are able to afford, 
and who desire to experience, the thrill of a novel and expensive 
mode of luxurious transportation. 
The number of persons using the airport will be about equal to the 
total number of persons who engage in big-game hunting, trips to 
the African wilderness, and voyages of North Pole exploration. 
. . . . 
In the very nature of things, the vast majority of the inhabitants of 
the city, a 99 per cent. majority, cannot now and never can, reap any 
benefit from the existence of an airport. 
True it may be permitted to the ordinary common garden variety of 
citizen to enter the airport free of charge, so that he may press his 
face against some restricting barrier, and sunburn his throat gazing 
at his more fortunate compatriots as they sportingly navigate the 
empyrean blue. 
But beyond that, beyond the right to hungrily look on, the ordinary 
citizen gets no benefit from the taxes he is forced to pay.23 
The Supreme Court of Missouri rejected this view, however, 
recognizing that, by 1928, it was “unquestionably true that the 
airplane [was] not in general use as a means of travel or 
transportation, either in the city of St. Louis or elsewhere; [but] it 
never will be unless properly equipped landing fields are 
established.”24 
In Hesse v. Rath,25 also decided in 1928, Judge Benjamin N. 
Cardozo, the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals at the 
time, similarly embraced the era of modern aviation, recognizing that 
“[a]viation is to-day an established method of transportation.”26  In 
doing so, the eventual United States Supreme Court Justice cautioned 
against shortsighted urban planners and politicians: 
The city that is without the foresight to build the ports for the new 
traffic may soon be left behind in the race of competition.  
Chalcedon was called the city of the blind, because its founders 
rejected the nobler site of Byzantium lying at their feet.  The need 
for vision of the future in the governance of cities has not lessened 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. at 1047. 
 24. Id. (emphasis added). 
 25. 164 N.E. 342 (N.Y. 1928). 
 26. Id. at 342. 
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with the years.  The dweller within the gates, even more than the 
stranger from afar, will pay the price of blindness.27 
Legislatures around the nation embraced this message as courts 
recognized airport development as a valid municipal purpose.  For 
example, the Florida Legislature authorized municipal corporations 
to purchase (including by way of a right of condemnation), establish, 
construct, and operate airports and landing fields.  Courts upheld 
such laws on constitutional grounds, including in State v. Dade 
County, in which the Supreme Court of Florida stated: 
[T]his Court knows that air transportation is one of the great 
innovations of the age, that Miami is potentially one of the greatest 
air distribution points in the World, and that Florida is the port of 
entry for air transportation from South and Central America, the 
West Indies, and Africa.  It is quite true that there were no Jules 
Verns or Wright Brothers in the Constitutional Convention to 
portend the marvelous changes the future had in store, but it was 
not intended by those present that the dead hand of the past should 
shape the destiny of the future.  Constitutional mandates are wise in 
proportion to the manner in which they respond to the public 
welfare and should be construed to effectuate that purpose when 
possible.  The law does not look with favor on social or progressive 
stalemates . . . . [and] extension of political controls should keep 
pace with physical changes, and collective ingenuity should not be 
hobbled by the Constitution in a way to be outclassed by collective 
design to overreach and serve a selfish purpose.28 
Between the time of these court decisions and the end of World 
War II, private, public, and commercial aviation became routine, so 
much so that state courts, again such as the Supreme Court of Florida 
in the decision of Brooks v. Patterson, rejected claims sounding in 
nuisance and trespass in connection with airplane operations: 
The City should be mindful at all times of the admonition which 
comes to us from the days of the Roman Empire, ‘sicutere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas’—so use your own property as not to injure 
another’s.  That aviation is as much a part of modern civilization is 
as the railroad, steamship and automobile as a means of 
transportation of both freight and passengers is too obvious for 
serious discussion.29 
Today, a world without airports and airplanes is unimaginable.  But 
the question of where the newest airplanes can fly, particularly in the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. 
 28. State v. Dade Cty., 27 So. 2d 283, 285 (Fla. 1946). 
 29. 31 So. 2d 472, 474 (Fla. 1946). 
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middle area between privately owned air space and the public 
navigable airspace, is unsettled.  Dysart, Hesse, and Brooks suggest 
that this issue is one that local courts are well able to handle, and are 
also perhaps better situated than federal lawmakers and regulators far 
removed from local tolerances (and intolerances) connected to drone 
operations. 
II.  AIRSPACE AND SUPREMACY:  ACCESS AND CONTROL 
While the zoning, planning, and funding of airports are generally 
matters of local authority,30 allowing airplanes—manned or 
unmanned—to fly requires regulators to balance national (and even 
international) airspace rights with local and state ground rights.  The 
nineteenth century case Guille v. Swan31 was one of the first cases to 
examine these competing interests.  There, the operator of an air 
balloon crash-landed into a private garden in New York.32  “When 
the balloon descended, [the balloonist called for assistance and] more 
than two hundred persons broke into [the] garden through the fences, 
and came onto the premises [to his rescue], beating down [the 
garden’s] vegetables and flowers.”33  The landowner sued for 
damages and won, convincing the court that the balloonist was liable 
because the damages caused by his trespass were foreseeable as a 
matter of law: 
Ascending in a balloon is not an unlawful act . . . but, it is certain, 
that the Aeronaut has no control over its motion horizontally; he is 
at the sport of the winds, and is to descend when and how he can; his 
reaching the earth is a matter of hazard.  He did descend on the 
premises of the plaintiff below, at a short distance from the place 
where he ascended.  Now, if his descent, under such circumstances, 
would, ordinarily and naturally, draw a crowd of people about him, 
either from curiosity, or for the purpose of rescuing him from a 
perilous situation; all this he ought to have foreseen, and must be 
responsible for. 34 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Beyond the scope of this Article are the laws and policies associated with 
federal funding of airports, including the grant assurance program, which obligate 
putatively local airports to comply with federal law. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
ASSURANCES:  AIRPORT SPONSORS (2014), https://www.faa.gov/airports/aip/grant_
assurances/media/airport-sponsor-assurances-aip.pdf [https://perma.cc/P63C-UV8A]. 
 31. 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 381 
 34. Id. at 381, 383.  More than a century after it was announced, the rule 
expressed in Guille, that the doctrine of strict liability controls legal disputes 
concerning injuries caused by aircraft to persons and things on land, was 
reformulated: 
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Guille reflected an early view of aviation as an ultra-hazardous 
activity for which owners, operators, and manufacturers were strictly 
liable.35  The court subordinated the rights of early aviators to the 
rights of private property owners.36  This changed in the middle of the 
last century, when regulators diminished the reach of private property 
owners relative to aviators. 
In United States v. Causby, the United States Supreme Court 
abandoned the Roman doctrine of cujus est solum ejus usque ad 
coelom—“whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to Heaven.”37  The 
Court did so in connection with a lawsuit by a North Carolina farmer 
who sued the federal government for inverse condemnation.  The 
landowner contended that Army and Navy bombers and fighter 
airplanes taking off and landing at an airfield close to his barn 
deprived him of the commercial uses and private enjoyment of his 
property.38  In fact, heavy bombers, transports, and fighter airplanes 
repeatedly flew at low altitudes and landed along a “path of glide” 
that was a mere eighty-three feet above the farmer’s property, sixty-
three feet above his barn, and eighteen feet above the highest tree on 
his property.39  He claimed that light and noise from the airplanes not 
only terrified his family, but caused his chickens to kill themselves 
                                                                                                                 
If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the ground is caused by 
the ascent, descent or flight of aircraft, or by the dropping or falling of an 
object from the aircraft, 
(a) the operator of the aircraft is subject to liability for the harm, even 
though he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it, and 
(b) the owner of the aircraft is subject to similar liability if he has authorized 
or permitted the operation.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“Ground 
Damage from Aircraft”).   
Some courts have applied a comparative negligence standard to the issue of whether 
owners and operators flying aircraft should be strictly liability for ground damage 
caused by operation of aircraft. See, e.g., Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co. of Wash., 746 
P.2d 1198 (Wash. 1987). Compare Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Dunlop, 266 
N.Y.S. 469, 473 (Cty. Ct. 1933) (finding strict liability for trespass and property 
damaged caused by airplane crash), with Crist v. Civil Air Patrol, 278 N.Y.S.2d 430, 
433-34 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (declining application of strict liability or doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur in absence of showing of intent to crash airplane:  “Technological advances 
and development, and the experiences of the last two decades have dissipated the 
universal early fears that flying was an ultra-hazardous occupation.  The application 
of the trespass theory advanced in the Dunlop case appears to be based to some 
extent on a recognition of such earlier fear.”). 
 35. See 19 Johns. at 383. 
 36. Id. at 382. 
 37. See 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946). 
 38. Id. at 258. 
 39. Id. 
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from fright, effectively destroying his commercial chicken farming 
business on his private property.40  The federal government argued 
that its airplane operations had not effected a deprivation or taking of 
the farmer’s property under the Constitution.41 
Government lawyers defended the flights on the basis of the Air 
Commerce Act of 1926.  Under that law, Congress vested the national 
government with “complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the 
air space,” reserving to American citizens “a public right of freedom 
of transit in air commerce through the navigable air space of the 
United States.”42  The “navigable air space” included “airspace above 
the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the “Civil 
Aeronautics Board” (the FAA’s predecessor entity).43  Thus, 
according to the government, the flights at issue were merely an 
exercise of the right of travel through the airspace within the 
minimum safe altitudes for flight established under the Air 
Commerce Act.44  Moreover, the flights could not and did not effect a 
taking because they occurred within the navigable airspace without 
any physical invasion of the farmer’s property.45  The government 
argued that, at most, only incidental damage occurred as a 
consequence of authorized air navigation.46 
The Supreme Court agreed that a taking had occurred, concluding 
that the airplane landings were as much an appropriation of the use of 
private property as a more conventional entry upon it: 
We would not doubt that if the United States erected an elevated 
railway over [the farmer’s] land at the precise altitude where its 
planes now fly, there would be a partial taking, even though none of 
the supports of the structure rested on the land.  The reason is that 
there would be an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract 
from the owner’s full enjoyment of the property and to limit his 
exploitation of it.  While the owner does not in any physical manner 
occupy that stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conventional 
sense, he does use it in somewhat the same sense that space left 
between buildings for the purpose of light and air is used.  The 
superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that 
continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land 
itself.  We think that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. at 259. 
 41. See id. at 260. 
 42. Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. §§ 176(a), 403 (1938)). 
 43. Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 180 (1938)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same category as 
invasions of the surface.47 
Notably, the flights in Causby were not those of private operators, 
but of a public operator—the federal government.  The farmer’s only 
remedy was monetary, in an amount that corresponded to whether 
the taking was temporary or permanent (an issue the Court did not 
reach).  In its reasoning, the Court abandoned historical notions of 
unlimited air rights for private property rights and instead recognized 
a public navigational easement above private property for the use of 
aviators: 
The flight of aircraft is lawful ‘unless at such a low altitude as to 
interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water, or the 
space over the land or water, is put by the owner, or unless so 
conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property 
lawfully on the land or water beneath.’48 
The Causby majority reasoned that “[t]he airplane is part of the 
modern environment of life” where ancient doctrines of airspace 
ownership such as ad coelom “ha[d] no place in the modern world.  
The air is a public highway . . . . Were that not true, every 
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless 
trespass suits.”49  Causby thus marked a reboot of putatively fixed 
property law doctrines, accepting as routine the concept of machines 
flying in the sky—above and through columns of airspace above 
privately owned parcels of land.  But, Causby did not address at what 
altitude a private property owner’s air rights ended and the navigable 
air space began, particularly at low altitudes. 
This unanswered question left many low-altitude airspace issues 
unresolved.  In fact, mid-1940s era regulators had not codified any air 
traffic rules placing the airspace needed for take-off and landing 
within the public domain.  Therefore, the Supreme Court was not 
asked to evaluate the validity of any regulation prescribing any 
specific altitude as the minimum safe altitude or the “immediate 
reaches above the land.”50  As such, Causby did not define a precise 
altitude beneath which an aircraft (whether government- or privately-
operated) could not fly over private property—an issue brought front 
and center by innovations in drone technology. 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. at 264-65. 
 48. Id. at 266 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-11 (1943)). 
 49. See id. at 261, 266. 
 50. See id. at 266. 
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Today, FAA regulations define the minimum safe operating 
altitudes for different kinds of aircraft.  Other than for takeoff and 
landing, a fixed-wing aircraft must fly at an altitude that allows its 
operators to conduct an emergency landing “without undue hazard to 
persons or property on the surface.”51  Over congested areas, the 
aircraft also must operate at least “1,000 feet above the highest 
obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft.”52  
Regulations reduce this altitude to “500 feet above the surface” over 
non-congested areas.53  In contrast, a helicopter may be flown below 
the minimum safe altitudes prescribed for fixed-wing aircraft if 
operated “without hazard to persons or property on the surface.”54 
In all, the national airspace system (“NAS”) is segmented into two 
airspace areas:  regulatory (Class A, B, C, D, and E airspace areas, as 
well as restricted and prohibited areas) and non-regulatory (military 
operations areas (“MOAs”), warning areas, alert areas, and 
controlled firing areas).55  Within these two categories, there are four 
types of airspace:  controlled, uncontrolled (e.g., Class G airspace is 
uncontrolled airspace), special use, and other airspace, extending to 
outer space (flight level 60,000 feet (“FL 600”)).56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 51. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(a) (2010). 
 52. Id. § 91.119(b). 
 53. See id. § 91.119(c). 
 54. Id. § 91.119(d); see also People v. Sabo, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170, 174-75 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1986) (“While helicopters may be operated at less than minimum altitudes so 
long as no hazard results, it does not follow that such operation is conducted within 
navigable airspace.  The plain meaning of the statutes defining navigable airspace as 
that airspace above specified altitudes compels the conclusion that helicopters 
operated below the minimum are not in navigable airspace.  The helicopter hovering 
above the surface of the land in such fashion as not to constitute a hazard to persons 
or property is, however, lawfully operated.”). 
 55. Compare Types of Controlled Airspace, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/ALC/course_content.aspx?cID=42&sID=505 
[https://perma.cc/MU29-TQ5K] (discussing types of regulatory airspace areas), with 
Other Special Use Airspace, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faasafety.gov/
gslac/ALC/course_content.aspx?cID=42&sID=243 [https://perma.cc/HEV2-2SCQ] 
(discussing non-regulatory types of airspace areas). 
 56. See FAA, Types of Controlled Airspace, supra note 55. 
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The United States has sole and exclusive authority over the NAS 
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.  Its authority 
is announced in 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a): 
Sovereignty and Public Right of Transit. 
(1)  The United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of 
airspace of the United States. 
(2)  A citizen of the United States has a public right of transit 
through the navigable airspace.57 
In addition to granting the United States government sole and 
exclusive authority of the NAS, federal law also authorizes the FAA 
to determine uses of the national airspace.  Under 49 U.S.C. § 40103, 
the FAA has broad authority to regulate, control, and develop plans 
for the use of the navigable airspace and to formulate policy for 
navigable airspace.58  The FAA specifically is invested with the power 
to “develop plans and policy for the use of the navigable airspace and 
assign by regulation or order the use of the airspace necessary to 
                                                                                                                 
 57. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (2012). 
 58. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d), which provides that the FAA must consider several 
matters as being in the public interest:   
(1) assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the highest 
priorities in air commerce; (2) regulating air commerce in a way that best 
promotes safety and fulfills national defense requirements; (3) encouraging 
and developing civil aeronautics, including new aviation technology; (4) 
controlling the use of the navigable airspace and regulating civil and military 
operations in that airspace in the interest of the safety and efficiency of both 
of those operations; (5) consolidating research and development for air 
navigation facilities and the installation and operation of those facilities; (6) 
developing and operating a common system of air traffic control and 
navigation for military and civil aircraft; and (7) providing assistance to law 
enforcement agencies in the enforcement of laws related to regulation of 
controlled substances, to the extent consistent with aviation safety. 
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ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace.”59  
Where drones fit into this regulatory scheme is unclear, as is who 
(e.g., local, state, or federal authorities) is empowered to regulate 
access and control of the low altitude airspace beneath the NAS 
where drones fly—including in areas below ground level and indoors. 
III.  QUESTIONS OF POLICE POWER AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
The FAA has acknowledged the principle that local authorities 
have “police powers” in five areas that are generally not subject to 
federal regulation:  land use, zoning, privacy, trespass, and law 
enforcement operations.60  In this context many states and local 
governments have enacted their own drone specific laws, which 
include extending existing criminal laws to drone owners and 
operators, e.g., reckless endangerment, a requirement for police to 
obtain a warrant prior to using a UAV for surveillance, a prohibition 
on the use of UAVs for voyeuristic purposes, a ban on UAVs for 
hunting or fishing, and a disallowance on the weaponization of 
UAVs, etc.61  In areas such as law enforcement, however, local 
interests overlap with federal enforcement powers, raising the 
complicated question of who, as among federal, state, and local 
authorities, has jurisdiction and control over the airspace above 
airports with respect to UAS operations. 
To date, the FAA has neither taken any legal action against any 
city or state’s drone-related laws, nor has it historically ever taken 
preemption action against decades-old city ordinances governing the 
flight of remote controlled aircraft within city limits and above city 
airspace.62  This inaction may reflect the well-established legal 
principle that cities have the authority to make reasonable time, 
manner, and place restrictions on airport and aircraft operations.63  
Under a 1940s-era statute in Florida, for example, the placement of 
                                                                                                                 
 59. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b). 
 60. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 42,064, 42,194 (June 28, 2016) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, 91, 101, 107, 
et al.); see also Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (noting that advertising is not one of the five areas that local authorities 
have police powers over). 
 61. See e.g., TIMOTHY M. RAVICH, COMMERCIAL DRONE LAW:  DIGEST OF U.S. 
AND GLOBAL UAS RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES (forthcoming American Bar 
Association 2017). 
 62. CTR. FOR CITY SOLS. & APPLIED RES., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITIES AND 
DRONES:  WHAT CITIES NEED TO KNOW ABOUT UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 
(UAVS) 5, 8 (2016), http://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2016-12/NLC%20Drone%20
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/785J-HRLS]. 
 63. See id. at 9. 
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airports is a matter of state regulation,64 as is the “area of land or 
water used for, or intended to be used for, landing and takeoff of 
aircraft, including appurtenant areas, buildings, facilities, or rights-of-
way necessary to facilitate such use or intended use.”65  Similar 
regulatory schemes exist in California,66 Illinois,67 Minnesota,68 New 
York,69 Oregon,70 and Texas.71  As detailed below, how and whether 
laws originally designed for manned aviation can or should coexist 
with emerging federal law respecting unmanned aviation is an 
elephant in the room and likely an issue for litigation in courthouses 
around the nation. 
A. Federalism and Preemption 
While the new civil small UAV rule announced in June 2016—14 
C.F.R. Part 107—allows private (i.e., civil) operators to fly small 
UAVs (i.e., less than fifty-five pounds) commercially, it does so in an 
incremental way.  Indeed, the rule is a “performance-based” 
approach by federal aviation regulators to integrate drones into the 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See FLA. STAT. § 330.30 (2005). 
 65. FLA. STAT. § 330.27 (2003). 
 66. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21663 (West 2016) (“It is unlawful for any 
political subdivision, any of its officers or employees, or any person to operate an 
airport unless an appropriate airport permit required by rule of the department has 
been issued by the department and has not subsequently been revoked.”). 
 67. See 620 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6, 42(b)(2) (2017) (authorizing the state to 
“classify and approve airports and restricted landing areas and any alterations or 
extensions thereof” where an “airport” means “any area of land, water, or both, 
except a restricted landing area, which is designed for the landing and take-off of 
aircraft . . . and all appurtenant areas used or suitable for airport buildings or other 
airport facilities, and all appurtenant rights of way . . . .”). 
 68. See CITY OF HAM LAKE, MINN., CITY CODE 9-470 (2000) (“It shall be unlawful 
for any person operating a Regulated Aircraft to take off from or land upon any land 
in the City of Ham Lake except as provided herein.”); CITY OF HAM LAKE, MINN., 
CITY CODE 9-470.1 (2000) (“Regulated Aircraft are prohibited from landing or 
taking off in the R-1, R-2, R-M, ML-PUD, PUD, RS-1, and RS-2 zoning districts.”). 
 69. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 240, 249 (McKinney 1967) (“No person 
shall . . . establish a privately-owned airport . . . except by authorization of the 
governing body of the city, village or town in which such airport or any part thereof is 
proposed to be established or improved” where “airport” means “any 
locality . . . which is used or intended to be used for the landing and take-off of 
aircraft . . . .”). 
 70. See OR. REV. STAT. § 215.416 (2015); see also Skydive Or., Inc. v. Clackamas 
Cty., 857 P.2d 879, 881-82 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). 
 71. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 24.021 (West 1997) (penalizing anyone who 
“takes off, lands, or maneuvers an aircraft, whether heavier or lighter than air, on a 
public highway, road, or street, except” in emergencies). 
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NAS.72  By August 2016, however, many states had already enacted 
their own UAV specific laws both to prevent risky operations and to 
respond to concerns about the potential for UAV operations of any 
kind to violate personal property and dignity (i.e., privacy) rights.  
Consequently, today, even after the enactment of Part 107, a 
patchwork of drone-centered statutes and ordinances has emerged 
beneath the altitude at which the NAS begins, pitting state UAV laws 
against national drone laws and presenting the questions of whether 
and how federal and state law are on the same level, and whether 
similar subject matters can coexist.73 
In contrast to the laws that have defined the relationship between 
federal and state governments for manned aviation over the last fifty 
years, UAV laws are not centralized.  In fact, federal law on the 
matter is incomplete, and not every state has enacted drone specific 
laws.  That being said, several states have enacted drone-centered 
laws alongside federal UAV laws, and in some states lawmakers acted 
specifically to fill a regulatory vacuum created by the years-long pace 
of rulemaking at the federal level.  In the 2016 legislative session 
alone, at least thirty-eight states considered legislation related to 
UAVs.74  Eighteen states—Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
and Wisconsin—passed thirty-two pieces of legislation.75  
“Alaska adopted a resolution supporting the aviation industry and 
urging the governor to make state land available for use in the 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 
Fed. Reg. 42,071 (June 28, 2016) (“After considering the comments, the FAA has 
decided to proceed incrementally and issue a final rule that immediately integrates 
the lowest-risk small UAS operations into the NAS.”). 
 73. In 2016, Section 2152 of the Senate’s proposed FAA Reauthorization Act set 
out to broadly preempt both states and cities from enacting laws related to the 
design, manufacture, testing, licensing, registration, certification, operation, or 
maintenance of UAS, including airspace, altitude, flight paths, equipment or 
technology requirements, purpose of operations, and pilot, operator, and observer 
qualifications, training, and certification. See CTR. FOR CITY SOLS. & APPLIED RES., 
supra note 62, at 17 (citing H.R. 636, 114th Cong. (2016), https://www.congress.gov/
114/bills/hr636/BILLS-114hr636eas.pdf [https://perma.cc/V74F-J8CW]).  The 
proposed law also sought to prohibit states and cities from including drones in laws 
related to nuisance, voyeurism, privacy, data security, harassment, reckless 
endangerment, wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage. Id.  Although 
this preemption language was not included in the final reauthorization act approved 
by Congress, it is unclear whether Congress will revisit the issue in the future. See id. 
 74. Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-
unmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape [https://perma.cc/KDJ5-XFBZ]. 
 75. Id. 
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development of UAS technology.”76  Delaware adopted a 
resolution expressing support for the development of many facets of 
UAVs and the increased economic and training opportunities 
available within the FAA regulatory framework.77  The governors of 
Georgia and North Dakota issued executive orders related to 
UAVs.78  In all, while not every state has enacted UAV related 
legislation, every state except South Dakota has considered some 
type of UAV legislation as of 2017.79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the states that enacted UAV laws, several expressly 
subordinated their laws to federal law or stated that their intent was 
not to interfere with federal law.80  For example, in a standalone 
provision entitled “Conformity to Federal Law,” Alaska’s drone laws 
provide that state aviation authorities “may not adopt a regulation, 
order, or standard that is inconsistent or contrary to any act of the 
Congress of the United States or regulations promulgated or 
standards established.”81  The law goes on to say that “[a] regulation, 
order, or standard may not be adopted that duplicates any current 
rules or regulations issued by a federal agency, or that applies to 
aircraft, airports, or air navigation facilities owned or operated by the 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Taking Off:  State Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Drones) Policies, NAT’L 
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
transportation/taking-off-state-unmanned-aircraft-systems-policies [https://perma.cc/
7SAA-LWWJ]. 
 80. See NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 74. 
 81. ALASKA STAT. § 02.15.030 (2016). 
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federal government.”82  No court has had the occasion to decide if 
this sort of language is consistent with existing federal law or whether 
existing federal aviation regulations have priority over state drone 
laws under no less an authority than the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution. 
In the absence of definite authority on the matter, the FAA issued 
a fact sheet in December of 2015 entitled “State and Local Regulation 
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).”83  There, the FAA suggested 
that “[s]tate and local restrictions affecting UAS operations should be 
consistent with the extensive federal statutory and regulatory 
framework pertaining to control of the airspace, flight management 
and efficiency, air traffic control, aviation safety, navigational 
facilities, and the regulation of aircraft noise at its source.”84  
Otherwise, the FAA contends: 
Substantial air safety issues are raised when state or local 
governments attempt to regulate the operation or flight of aircraft.  
If one or two municipalities enacted ordinances regulating UAS in 
the navigable airspace and a significant number of municipalities 
followed suit, fractionalized control of the navigable airspace could 
result.  In turn, this “patchwork quilt” of differing restrictions could 
severely limit the flexibility of FAA in controlling the airspace and 
flight patterns, and ensuring safety and an efficient air traffic flow.  
A navigable airspace free from inconsistent state and local 
restrictions is essential to the maintenance of a safe and sound air 
transportation system.85 
Framed in this way, the FAA has asserted exclusive jurisdiction 
over UAS operations in the NAS on the basis that Congress vested it 
with authority to regulate the areas of airspace use, management and 
efficiency, air traffic control, safety, navigational facilities, and aircraft 
noise at its source.86  Indeed, Congress directed the FAA to “develop 
plans and policy for the use of the navigable airspace and assign by 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. 
 83. OFF. OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., STATE AND LOCAL 
REGULATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) FACT SHEET (2015) 
[hereinafter UAS FACT SHEET], https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_regulations_
policy/media/uas_fact_sheet_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RDZ-VAFC]; see also FAA 
Issues Fact Sheet on State and Local UAS Laws, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Dec. 17, 
2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=84369 [https://perma.cc/M4LT-
S4S8]. 
 84. UAS FACT SHEET, supra note 83, at 1. 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. See id. at 1 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103, 44502, 44701-44735 (2012)). 
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regulation or order the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the 
safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace.”87  Congress 
[f]urther directed the FAA to “prescribe air traffic regulations on 
the flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes)” for 
navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft; protecting 
individuals and property on the ground; using the navigable airspace 
efficiently; and preventing collisions between aircraft, between 
aircraft and land or water vehicles, and between aircraft and 
airborne objects.88 
From this grant, the FAA has taken the position that it has total 
regulatory authority over matters pertaining to aviation safety and 
that its complete authority in the area of aviation safety ensures the 
maintenance of a safe and sound air transportation system and of 
navigable airspace free from inconsistent restrictions.89 
At the same time, however, the FAA elected not to supply a rule 
addressing the extent of Part 107’s preemptive effect on state and 
local regulation of UAS.  In the preamble to Part 107, the FAA 
actually stated several matters over which local regulation could be 
appropriate, noting: 
[T]his rule does not address preemption issues because those issues 
necessitate a case-specific analysis that is not appropriate in a rule of 
general applicability.  The FAA notes, however, that state 
governments have historically been able to regulate the takeoffs and 
landings of aircraft within their state boundaries.90 
. . . . 
The FAA is not persuaded that including a preemption provision in 
the final rule is warranted at this time.  Preemption issues involving 
small UAS necessitate a case-specific analysis that is not appropriate 
in a rule of general applicability.  Additionally, certain legal aspects 
concerning small UAS use may be best addressed at the State or 
local level.  For example, State law and other legal protections for 
individual privacy may provide recourse for a person whose privacy 
may be affected through another person’s use of a UAS.91 
. . . . 
Adjudicating private property rights are beyond the scope of this 
rule.  However, the provisions of this rule are not the only set of 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012)). 
 88. Id. at 1-2 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2) (2012)). 
 89. Id. at 2 (“A consistent regulatory system for aircraft and use of airspace has 
the broader effect of ensuring the highest level of safety for all aviation operations.”). 
 90. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 42,064, 42,189 (June 28, 2016). 
 91. Id. at 42,194. 
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laws that may apply to the operation of a small UAS.  With regard 
to property rights, trespassing . . . may be addressed by State and 
local trespassing laws.92 
. . . . 
[UAV operators] who do not have the facility owner’s permission to 
operate a UAS near or over the perimeter or interior of amusement 
parks and attractions may be violating State or local trespassing 
laws.93 
. . . . 
State law and other legal protections may already provide recourse 
for a person whose individual privacy, data privacy, private property 
rights, or intellectual property rights may be implicated by a remote 
pilot’s civil or public use of a UAS.94 
. . . . 
Substantial air safety issues are implicated when State or local 
governments attempt to regulate the operation of aircraft in the 
national airspace.  The Fact Sheet provides examples of State and 
local laws affecting UAS for which consultation with the FAA is 
recommended and those that are likely to fall within State and local 
government authority.  For example, consultation with FAA is 
recommended when State or local governments enact operational 
UAS restrictions on flight altitude, flight paths; operational bans; or 
any regulation of the navigable airspace.95 
The FAA has thus conceded some room for state and local UAS 
laws, albeit recommending that state authorities first consult federal 
aviation authorities in such matters.  For example, a city ordinance 
that bans anyone from operating UAS within the city limits, within 
the airspace of the city, or within certain distances of landmarks 
should be coordinated with the FAA, as should operational UAS 
restrictions on flight altitude, flight path, operational bans, and any 
regulation of the navigable airspace.96  State and local authorities 
should also consult with the FAA if and when mandating safety-
related equipment or UAS training—areas the FAA contends would 
likely be preempted.97 
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Miami-Dade County’s Ordinance Section 37-12 entitled, “Public 
Safety and Unmanned Aircraft Systems Commonly Known as 
Drones,” is an example of a failure in coordination between local and 
federal UAS regulators—with fault attributable to both parties.98  
Miami’s ordinance brought national attention to the tension between 
local governments and the FAA, when lawyers from the FAA called 
the city council to clarify that the federal agency had ultimate control 
over airspace.99  Part 107 does not diminish the potential for future 
similar conflicts between local and national authorities, as the FAA 
intends to “address preemption issues on a case-by-case basis rather 
than doing so in a rule of general applicability.”100  As to the 
regulation of flight altitude, flight paths, operational bans, or any 
regulation of the navigable airspace, moreover, the FAA declined to 
say whether local law was prohibited, stating instead that 
“consultation with FAA is recommended.”101 
B. Dillon’s Rule:  The Role of Local UAV Governance 
Like their counterparts at the national and state level, local 
lawmakers have tried to manage the proliferation of UAV operations 
over, near, at, and around airports, critical infrastructure, and public 
and private property by enacting various codes, ordinances, and 
policies.102  An unsuccessful attempt by the town of Deer Trail, 
Colorado, to authorize the issuance of licenses that would allow 
residents to hunt and shoot down drones is perhaps the most fantastic 
example.103 
Like their state counterparts, local authorities have acted where the 
efforts of federal regulators have lagged.  In November 2015, for 
example, Chicago became the first major American city to pass a 
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comprehensive drone ordinance.104  The co-sponsor of the ordinance, 
Alderman Edward Burke, explained the need for a local ordinance by 
stating, “[notwithstanding] those proposals being discussed in 
Washington, Chicago simply needs local laws in place to authorize the 
city to take action against those who operate drones recklessly and 
threaten public safety.”105 
Relating specifically to “small unmanned aircraft,” the Chicago 
ordinance did what many other local ordinances do—it established 
some of the same rules already promulgated by the FAA.  Namely, 
the ordinance prohibits any person from flying such aircraft “in city 
airspace” with the following exceptions:  for hobby or recreational 
purposes; over any person who is not involved in the operation of the 
small unmanned aircraft, without such person’s consent; over 
property that the operator does not own without the property owner’s 
consent and subject to any restrictions that the property owner may 
place on such operation; at an altitude higher than four hundred feet 
above ground level; in a careless or reckless manner; in violation of 
federal or state law; or within five miles of an airport.106  Violators are 
subject to a fine between five hundred and five thousand dollars or 
may be incarcerated for a term of up to 180 days.107  Despite its 
redundancy with federal UAV regulations, the ordinance carves out 
an exception for federal law: 
Operations Authorized by the FAA—Exception.  Notwithstanding 
the prohibitions set forth in this section, nothing in this section shall 
be construed to prohibit, limit or otherwise restrict any person who 
is authorized by the Federal Aviation Administration to operate a 
small unmanned aircraft in city air space, pursuant to Section 333 of 
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 or a certificate of 
waiver, certificate of authorization or airworthiness certificate under 
Section 44704 of Title 49 of the United States Code or other Federal 
Aviation Administration grant of authority for a specific flight 
operation(s), from conducting such operation(s) in accordance with 
the authority granted by the Federal Aviation Administration. 
. . . . 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See CTR. FOR CITY SOLS. & APPLIED RES., supra note 62, at 21; see also CHI., 
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APPLIED RES., supra note 62, at 21. 
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Operations Prohibited by the FAA—Clarification.  Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to authorize the operation of any small 
unmanned aircraft in city airspace in violation of any Federal statute 
or rules promulgated thereunder, including, but not limited to, any 
temporary flight restrictions or notices to airmen issued by the 
Federal Aviation Administration.108 
Other local laws around the nation are both subordinate on their 
face and duplicative of federal regulations.  For example, Ordinance 
No. 16-10 in Lawton, Oklahoma, relies on federal regulations, stating 
that “[u]nmanned aircraft Systems operations must be conducted in 
strict compliance with all Federal Aviation Administration 
regulations applicable to the particular operation” and that “[e]xcept 
for UAS operations specifically authorized by the FAA, the area 
within five (5) miles of and on airport property is a no drone zone.  
Unauthorized UAS operations in the no drone zone are strictly 
prohibited.”109  Again, whether these laws could survive a preemption 
challenge by federal regulators is a legal question that has not been 
yet tested in court. 
Finally, some states have cut off the ability of cities, municipalities, 
and local governments to regulate UAVs altogether by enacting state 
statutes giving state UAV law preemptive effect.  A state’s right to 
preempt and subordinate local law is sometimes referred to as 
Dillon’s Rule, named in connection with court decisions issued by 
Judge John F. Dillon of Iowa in 1868.110  Dillon’s Rule affirms the 
narrow interpretation of a local government’s authority, in which a 
sub-state government may engage in an activity only if it is specifically 
sanctioned by the state government.111  The tenets of Dillon’s Rule 
have become a cornerstone of American municipal law and have 
been applied to municipal powers in most states, providing that:  
municipal corporations can exercise only the powers explicitly 
granted to them; those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to 
the powers expressly granted; and those essential to the declared 
objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient, but 
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indispensable.112  A number of states have applied Dillon’s Rule to 
drone law: 
• Alaska state law preempts local law with respect to images 
captured by drones, stating, “[a] municipality may not adopt an 
ordinance that permits the release of images captured by an 
unmanned aircraft system in a manner inconsistent with [Alaska 
Stat.] 18.65.903” which governs the retention of images.113 
• Arizona state law provides that “[e]xcept as authorized by law, 
a city, town or county may not enact or adopt any ordinance, policy or 
rule that relates to the ownership or operation of an unmanned 
aircraft system or otherwise engage in the regulation of the ownership 
or operation of an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system.  
Any ordinance, policy or rule that violates this subsection, whether 
enacted or adopted by the city, town or county before or after [the 
effective date of this section], is void.”114 
• Maryland codified a law that vests the state government with 
exclusive authority to regulate the testing or operation of unmanned 
aircraft systems, preempting the authority of counties and 
municipalities:  “Only the State may enact a law or take any other 
action to prohibit, restrict, or regulate the testing or operation of 
unmanned aircraft systems in the State.”  As such, the law “(1) 
preempts the authority of a county or municipality to prohibit, 
restrict, or regulate the testing or operation of unmanned aircraft 
systems; and (2) supersedes any existing law or ordinance of a county 
or municipality that prohibits, restricts, or regulates the testing or 
operation of unmanned aircraft systems.”115 
• In 2016, Rhode Island enacted its first drone law, giving the 
state and the Rhode Island Airport Cooperation exclusive authority 
to regulate “any object capable of flying that is remotely controlled 
and flies autonomously through software-controlled flight plans 
embedded in the object’s system by a global-position system, 
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commonly known as unpiloted aerial vehicles, remotely piloted 
aircraft, drones, or unmanned aircraft systems.”116  But all of this may 
be for naught as the law concludes by stating that “[i]f federal law 
preempts any provision of this chapter, that provision shall not 
apply.” 117 
• No locality in Virginia is permitted to regulate the use of 
privately owned, unmanned aircraft system within its boundaries.118 
In contrast to these jurisdictions, a unit of local government in 
North Carolina has explicit authority to adopt an ordinance to 
regulate the use of the local government’s property for the launch and 
recovery of UAS.119  Overall, applying Dillon’s Rule in the drone age 
is a new legal issue, though it would seem that local laws should have 
priority over broader state laws, which should have priority over even 
broader federal rules of the air, as is the case in other transportation 
modes and as was the case when state courts acceded to local and 
municipal plans to zone, finance, and operate local airports.120 
IV.  UAVS AND AIRPORTS 
The likely emergence of airports dedicated exclusively to 
unmanned aviation further complicates the foregoing discussion of 
police powers, preemption and Dillion’s Rule as applied to traditional 
airports and manned aviation.121  For example, just last year the 
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Boulder City Council in Nevada unanimously approved a twenty-year 
joint land-lease agreement between the city and Aerodrome to build 
a drone airport in Eldorado Valley.122  In addition, the Small Business 
Committee of the United States House of Representatives recently 
heard testimony about private companies interested in developing 
airports specifically for drones—so-called “droneports.”123 
Meanwhile, interest in drone-only facilities is significant 
internationally.  For example, Rwanda could be the first country in 
the world with a network of drone airports, as its civil aviation 
authority is reportedly drafting regulations ahead of investor interest 
in building a logistics system in Africa to transport medicine in areas 
difficult to reach by road.124  These droneports will “support cargo 
drone routes capable of delivering urgent and precious supplies to 
remote areas on a massive scale,” according to a British architecture 
firm that foresees droneports as a new and potentially ubiquitous 
typology: 
Cargo drone routes have utility wherever there is a lack of roads.  
Just as mobile phones dispensed with landlines, cargo drones can 
transcend geographical barriers such as mountains, lakes, and 
unnavigable rivers without the need for large-scale physical 
infrastructure.  Just a third of Africans live within two kilometres of 
an all-season road, and there are no continental motorways, almost 
no tunnels, and not enough bridges that can reach people living in 
far-flung areas of the continent.  It would require unprecedented 
levels of investment in roads and railways to catch up with the 
exponential growth in Africa’s population, which is set to double to 
2.2 billion by 2050.  An ‘infrastructural leap’ is essential using drone 
technology and clean energy systems to surmount the challenges of 
the future. 
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The specialist drones can carry blood and life-saving supplies over 
100 kilometres at minimal cost, providing an affordable alternative 
that can complement road-based deliveries.  Two parallel networks 
would operate services, the Redline using smaller drones for medical 
and emergency supplies; and the commercial Blueline that would 
transport crucial larger payloads such as spare parts, electronics, and 
e-commerce, complementing and subsidising the Redline network. 
The Droneport offers a new typology for a building which we hope 
will grow into a ubiquitous presence, much like petrol stations have 
become dispersed infrastructure for road traffic.  The proposal will 
have a strong civic presence, based on sharing and multiple uses.  It 
allows for safe landing of quiet drones in a densely packed area, and 
includes a health clinic, a digital fabrication shop, a post and courier 
room, and an e-commerce trading hub, allowing it to become part of 
local community life.125 
Notwithstanding this and other future-oriented initiatives for 
droneports, current UAV operations present traditional airports with 
significant challenges, particularly in the dynamic and comparatively 
busy NAS over the United States.  For instance, no standards, 
including established traffic patterns, exist for UAV operation.126  In 
terms of facility planning, moreover, the United States Department of 
Transportation transmitted the 2017-2021 National Plan of Integrated 
Airport Systems (“NPIAS”) to Congress on September 30, 2016, and 
recently released the National Plan of Integrated Airports Systems 
2017-2021.127  But, only two of eighty pages in these documents 
discuss UAS, and even then only by way of brief overview and 
summary.128  Still, the FAA has voiced certain goals respecting the 
safe integration of UAS proximity to airports: 
The FAA’s goal is to safely integrate UAS into the NAS.  Safety of 
the NAS is enhanced when the operator of a UAS and the airport 
operator coordinate prior to a UAS flight on or near an airport.  
This coordination enhances integration into the NAS by: 
• Allowing the airport operator to help the operator of 
the UAS aircraft understand the areas of manned aircraft flight near 
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the airport, reducing the potential for conflicts 
between UAS activities and manned aircraft flights; 
• Allowing the airport operator to understand the proposed 
parameters of the UAS activities for situational awareness and 
coordination with airport tenants and users as necessary; 
• Allowing the airport operator to advise the UAS operator of 
unique manned aircraft activities near the airport (e.g., parachute 
activities, glider activities, etc.); 
• Allowing the airport operator to understand 
where UAS activities on or near the airport are occurring; and 
• Encouraging coordination of the airport sponsor with the local 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities, Flight Standards District Office 
(FSDO), and Airports District Office (ADO), and local law 
enforcement.129 
While these regulatory aspirations for small UAV operations have 
been generally well received—as has Part 107, allowing flight for civil 
(including commercial) purposes under certain circumstances—the 
UAV community has expressed confusion about UAV operations 
near the nation’s 19,000 commercial, cargo, and general aviation 
airports, particularly with respect to:  (1) the notice UAS operators 
must give airports in (uncontrolled) Class G airspace, if any, and (2) 
whether airport owners, managers, and sponsors can refuse or decline 
to allow UAV operations near their airports without running afoul of 
FAA jurisdiction over matters of safety in the NAS.130 
Indeed, while Part 107 identifies who can fly and under what 
circumstances, airports around the nation have expressed uncertainty 
about whether UAV operators must provide advance notice of their 
operations and, as important, whether airports can deny requests for 
UAV operation.131  Part 107, in fact, offers scant guidance, containing 
two—but only two—provisions explicitly dealing with airports and 
airspace in the vicinity of airports: 
14 C.F.R. § 107.41 Operation in certain airspace.  No person may 
operate a small unmanned aircraft in Class B, Class C, or Class D 
airspace or within the lateral boundaries of the surface area of Class 
E airspace designated for an airport unless that person has prior 
authorization from Air Traffic Control (ATC). 
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14 C.F.R. § 107.43 Operation in the vicinity of airports.  No person 
may operate a small unmanned aircraft in a manner that interferes 
with operations and traffic patterns at any airport, heliport, or 
seaplane base. 
Causing further confusion is language in the preamble to Part 107 
in which the FAA has emphasized its exclusive authority of the 
airspace overlying an airport, while at the same time acknowledging 
that airports have the power to govern UAV operations on the 
surface of the airport.  The FAA stopped short of allowing airports to 
regulate the airspace above and near the airport with respect to UAV 
operations: 
Under 49 U.S.C. 40103, the FAA has the sole authority to regulate 
airspace, including airspace overlying an airport.  While airport 
operators have the ability to manage operations on the surface of 
the airport, airport operators may not regulate the use of airspace 
above and near the airport.  In an effort to safely integrate small 
unmanned aircraft and manned aircraft at an airport, airport 
operators may recommend certain areas where small UAS operate, 
in order to avoid conflicts with manned aircraft.  The FAA does not 
consider the notification of airport operators to significantly 
enhance the safety of integration with existing operations.  The 
requirement for notification creates a burden on the airport 
operator with little benefit to users of the airport, because the 
airport operator would have no requirement to disseminate 
knowledge of small UAS operations to other airport users.132 
In this context, the Experimental Aircraft Association, the 
National Association of State Aviation Officials, the Minneapolis-
Saint Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission, the United States 
Hang Gliding & Paragliding Association, the Permanent Editorial 
Board of the Aviators Model Code of Conduct Initiative, and several 
individual commentators argued that the FAA should require 
operators intending to fly small UAVs within five miles of airports in 
Class G airspace to notify airport authorities in advance of the 
operations.133  These commenters said that such notification would 
allow airport authorities, in turn, to notify aircraft in proximity of the 
airport of the small UAV activity.134  Other airport stakeholders 
argued that airport operators should be permitted to limit small UAV 
operations on and around airports.135  The FAA has specifically 
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declined to require notification to the airport under Part 107, 
however, providing instead: 
Because the NPRM did not contemplate prohibiting operations 
within the vicinity of an airport in class G airspace, the FAA will not 
restrict small UAS operations within a specified distance from an 
airport.  Rather, in response to concerns regarding the integration of 
small UAS and manned aircraft, this rule will prohibit remote pilots 
from operating their small unmanned aircraft in a manner that 
interferes with operations and traffic patterns at airports, heliports, 
and seaplane bases.136 
. . . . 
Because remote pilots have an obligation to yield right of way to all 
other aircraft and avoid interfering in traffic pattern operations, the 
FAA expects that most remote pilots will avoid operating in the 
vicinity of airports because their aircraft generally do not require 
airport infrastructure, and the concentration of other aircraft 
increases in the vicinity of airports.137 
This scheme, instead of offering clarity, has created uncertainty 
about airport notification requirements related to UAV activity.  
While Part 107 seems not to require advance notice by UAV 
operators to uncontrolled airports, other laws, including Section 333 
of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, require UAV 
operators to either notify or seek approval from airports regarding 
their intent to operate near airports.138 
Some local authorities are filling the regulatory void.  For example, 
the City of Longmont, Colorado, Ordinance 13.39.040 identifies UAV 
flight as a “restricted activity” such that operators must provide 
advance notification to an airport manager before flying and fly in 
accordance with the specific requirements stipulated by the airport 
manager unless otherwise approved by agreement, aircraft operators, 
or owners.139  The ordinance further states that UAV operators 
“within five miles of the airport shall comply with all applicable legal 
requirements.  This may include, but is not limited to, notifying and 
obtaining written permission from the airport manager to fly UAV 
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or UAS within protected airspace.”140  Ordinances like this fail to 
resolve the questions raised above about reconciling police power, 
preemption, and Dillon’s Rule. 
In any case, the absence of any regulatory requirement of notice of 
UAV operations in unsupervised airspace (Class G airspace) near 
airport runways is a major issue for many airport operators.  
“Dangerous” is how one airport manager described the situation:  
“What’s to prevent somebody from flying at the end of my 
runway?”141  Indeed, while the FAA has asserted exclusive 
jurisdiction over the NAS—that is, all airspace “above the grass”—
airport operators and sponsors have expressed concern about a 
regulatory scheme that allows them to stop an operator from 
launching a UAV, but not from flying near or around the airport.142 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly thirty years ago, in a dissenting opinion in Florida v. Riley, 
Justice William Brennan presented a hypothetical situation prophetic 
of modern drone operations and the limitations of property law: 
Imagine a helicopter capable of hovering just above an enclosed 
courtyard or patio without generating any noise, wind, or dust at 
all—and, for good measure, without posing any threat of injury.  
Suppose the police employed this miraculous tool to discover not 
only what crops people were growing in their greenhouses, but also 
what books they were reading and who their dinner guests were.  
Suppose, finally, that the FAA regulations remained unchanged, so 
that the police were undeniably “where they had a right to be.”  
Would today’s plurality continue to assert that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures” was not infringed by 
such surveillance?  Yet that is the logical consequence of the 
plurality’s rule that, so long as the police are where they have a right 
to be under air traffic regulations, the Fourth Amendment is 
offended only if the aerial surveillance interferes with the use of the 
backyard as a garden spot.  Nor is there anything in the plurality’s 
opinion to suggest that any different rule would apply were the 
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police looking from their helicopter, not into the open curtilage, but 
through an open window into a room viewable only from the air.143 
Today, drones are the “miraculous tool” Justice Brennan imagined.  
However, the law remains unsettled as to where public or private 
operators “have a right to be” or who has the authority to say.  In 
addition, drone operations pose a complex problem beyond where to 
fly and who, among local, state, and federal officials, should regulate 
that flight.  The equipage of over-the-counter drones, including high-
definition cameras and live-streaming imaging sensors, is incredibly 
invasive.  The law has yet to catch up with these advances on the 
ground even as the availability of “smart” devices become common 
and public attitudes about privacy (e.g., Facebook) change in 
comprehensive ways. 
Alternatively, consider the first aviation law in the United States, 
which was well ahead of its time.  The town of Kissimmee, Florida, 
enacted an ordinance in 1908 regulating the town’s airspace up to 
twenty-five miles above the ground, forbidding the flight of any 
balloons, airplanes, helicopters, ornithopters, or airships from flying 
within ten feet of streets and alleys, or within twenty feet of any 
pavement at a speed greater than eight miles per hour.144  Section 10 
of the ordinance stated:  “As soon as practicable, the Council shall 
purchase an aeroplane of approved modern type for the use of the 
marshal in the performance of his public duties, and to enable him to 
properly enforce the provisions of this ordinance.”145  The ordinance 
is noteworthy because no airplanes flew in Kissimmee until 1911—
three years after the ordinance was enacted, prompting the 
Washington Post to report in 1910: 
It is safe to predict that legislation to govern the regulation of aerial 
traffic will before very long engage the attention of State and city 
legislative bodies throughout the country.  And when the questions 
of speed, height, or proximity to congested centers of population 
have become the subject of animated debate it may be expected that 
Kissimmee, Fla., will extend the municipal chest in haughty 
satisfaction, for it was Kissimmee that raised a laugh some two years 
ago by framing a city ordinance covering the subject.  The only thing 
that was really laughable about Kissimmee’s agitation over the 
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deviltries of aerial craft was the fact that it was somewhat 
premature.146 
Taken together, Riley and the Kissimmee ordinance demonstrate 
the degree to which the law alternatively lags behind or over-
anticipates147 technological change.  These authorities also illustrate 
how regulators have both over-regulated and under-regulated the 
airspace in the drone age.  On the one hand, federal regulators have 
crafted a workable set of regulations for civil and commercial drones 
at 14 C.F.R. Part 107.  On the other hand, they have failed to create a 
clear rule to restrict drone operations in the uncontrolled airspace 
near airports.  The FAA’s claim of exclusive jurisdiction in the 
airspace beneath the NAS is an aggravating factor.  As a result, 
airport owners, operators, and managers remain uncertain as to 
whether they can deny drone operations near their fields in 
uncontrolled airspace.  The FAA should ultimately clarify the current 
state of affairs by granting airports the power to deny drone 
operations, preserving local autonomy as a new era of airports, 
droneports, and airspace arrives.148 
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